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however, has no solid legal basis on which to be premised. In view of the
suppression of competition through controlled admission requirements and the
price fixing activities in which the professions are now engaged, per se immunity from the antitrust laws is clearly undesirable. Although the question of
interstate commerce may be a jurisdictional barrier in some instances, it is
clearly surmountable in most. The degree of state involvement will be of
primary importance in many situations and is perhaps the most difficult obstacle in attempting to apply the Sherman Act to professional anti-competitive
activity. However, unreasonable restraints upon economic activity, whether by
commercial enterprise or professional organization, are patently inconsistent
with our economic system. Absent an express contrary congressional intent,
any contract, combination, or conspiracy restraining any economic activity
should be subjected to the strictures of the Sherman Act.
KENNETH

C.

ELLIS

SETTLEMENT DEVICES WITH JOINT TORTFEASORS
Although personal injury claims involve human elements, the ultimate
legal remedy is expressed monetarily. Yet, money has not always been the exclusive method of reparation. Under the Hammurabi Code the concept of "an
eye for an eye" prevailed. Physicians adjudged guilty of malpractice were required to suffer severance of the right hand.1 Vestiges of this approach remain
today. The surviving pilot of a Yemen airplane crash was recently held accountable for the loss of his passengers. For punishment, he was pushed from
2
an airliner at the same latitude, longitude, and altitude.
Anglo-American civil remedies fortunately have been tempered. However,
a spectrum of alternatives to judicial determination is provided by settlement
devices, dependent upon the nature of the suit and the financial position of
the parties. 3 The litigants are free to design a compromise agreement in any
manner, being limited only by public policy.4 Settlement may be achieved at
any stage of the proceedings, 5 provided it avoids delay, obtains justice, and
I. Sindell, Settlement Techniques-As Viewed by a Plaintiff's Attorney, 15 PRAc. LAw.
82 (1969).
2.
3.

Id. at 83.
For a detailed consideration of the variables that control the negotiation of a settle-

ment agreement, see Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. REv. 67 (1969).
4. Rotunda, The Public Interest Appellant: Limitations on the Right of Competent
PartiesTo Settle Litigation Out of Court, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 199 (1966).
5. Id.
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upholds the integrity of the judicial system. Such compromises have long been
a method to avoid costly, time-consuming litigation. Because they play an increasingly important role in the resolution of civil disputes, it is the purpose
of this note to consider the traditional settlement devices with and between
joint tortfeasors, including a recent innovation, the Mary Carter Agreement.0
SUBSTANTrvE TORT LAW

Joint Tort: Meaningand Distinction
With the introduction in 1848 of the New York Field Code of Procedure
and similar provisions in a majority of states,7 joinder of concurrent wrongdoers became possible in addition to the previously permitted joinder of tortfeasors acting pursuant to a mutual plan. Unfortunately, subsequent courts
often failed to distinguish between the procedural nature of the new permissive joinder and the substantive law concepts applicable only to mutually participating wrongdoers. The result was confusion and uncertainty in the use of
the terms "joint tort" and "joint tortfeasors."5'
The common law definition of joint tort was vicarious liability for concerted action pursuant to a common purpose, where the act of one is imputed
to another. 9 Because all defendants were considered one, each was liable for
the entire damage whether or not his conduct actually inflicted the injury.10
Developed from criminal law, 1 this concept remains viable;12 it is hereinafter
termed "a pure joint tort."
The second interpretation of joint tort is procedural, denoting the joinder
of two or more persons in the same civil action; hence, it is here termed "the
procedural joint tort." The early common law was strict, denying joinder if
the tortfeasors acted independently, even though they caused an indivisible
injury.'3 American courts initially adopted this requirement but frequently
relaxed it in equity. 4 Reluctant at first,'9 most courts subsequently permitted
joinder of several defendants where their action resulted in a single injury.'6
6. Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
7. The statutes were designed to encourage settlement of all issues in a single transaction.
Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817 (1924). Any person could be joined as a
defendant who had an interest adverse to plaintiff or who was a necessary party for the complete determination of the questions involved. Id. at 818.
8. See Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Boone, 85 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1956).
9. W. PRossER, LAw or TORTS §46, at 291 (4th ed. 1971).
10. Miller v. Singer, 131 Colo. 112, 116, 279 P.2d 846, 848 (1955). It is immaterial that
damage inflicted by one exceeds what reasonably may have been foreseen. Thompson v.
Johnson, 180 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1950).
11. W. PRossER, supra note 9, §46, at 292.
12. Garrett v. Garrett, 228 N.C. 530, 46 S.E.2d 302 (1948).
13. W. PRossm, supra note 9, §47, at 293.
14. Compare Desforge v. American-British Home Bldg. Ass'n, 63 R.I. 305, 7 A.2d 788
(1939), with Bard v. Yohn, 26 Pa. 482 (1856).
15. Johnson v. City of Fairmont, 188 Minn. 451, 247 N.W. 572 (1933); Ader v. Blau, 241
N.Y. 7, 148 N.E. 771 (1925).
16. See Lovingood v. Butler Constr. Co., 100 Fla. 1252, 131 So. 126 (1930).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss4/5

2

Kennedy: Settlement Devices with Joint Tortfeasors

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

Today the weight of authority treats procedural joinder as a matter of con17
venience and construes its requirements liberally.
Procedural joint tort is permissive joinder.18 One defendant cannot compel
the plaintiff to bring another defendant into the proceeding, since each may
be sued separately.1 9 Nor may one co-defendant be heard to complain as to
the dismissal of the other co-defendant. A general exception to this rule arises,
however, when liability of a principal rests upon the negligence of his agent
under the theory of respondeat superior.There, failure to establish negligence
20
against the agent necessitates dismissal of the principal.
Confusion between pure and procedural joint tortfeasors remains today in
some jurisdictions. Because only pure joint torts existed at common law, it
was reasonable to declare that only one judgment could be rendered, with
each defendant personally liable for the entire sum. With the creation and development of procedural joint tortfeasors, this rule was subsequently applied
to both types of tortfeasors. 21 With respect to procedural joint tortfeasors this
result has been severely criticized as unnecessary and contrary to established
2
substantive law".
Satisfaction
At common law the injured party was entitled to only one compensation
for his loss, even though a verdict and judgment had been rendered against
several defendants. Any satisfaction of the claim precluded enforcement of his
right. 23 An unsatisfied judgment, however, did not bar a subsequent action
against another defendant. The plaintiff could refuse tender from one in
anticipation of a larger recovery in the next suit. 24 With respect to this general
rule two corollaries arose: (1) where a second judgment for plaintiff was received it had to be offset pro tanto by the amount paid on the first judgment
and (2) upon full satisfaction of the first judgment execution on the second
25
was barred.
A distinction must be made between satisfaction and release. Satisfaction
is the acceptance of full compensation for an injury, whereas release is the
surrender of one's chose in action, either gratuitously, or more frequently, for

17. E.g., Slavin v. Kay, 108 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1958); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153
So. 2d 45 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
18. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, §47, at 293.
19. Sox v. Hertz Corp., 262 F. Supp. 531, 532 (D.S.C. 1967); FLt.. R. Civ. P. 1.250.
20. Pangburn v. Buick Motor Co., 211 N.Y. 228, 231, 105 N.E. 423, 425 (1914). Mississippi,
however, adheres to the unique rule permitting inconsistent verdicts against principals and
agents, upon the reasoning that they could be sued separately and thereby held independently
liable. Gulf Refining Co. v. Myrick, 220 Miss. 429, 71 So. 2d 217 (1954).
21. See Sawdey v. RAV.Rasmussen Co., 107 Cal. App. 467, 290 P. 684 (1930).
22. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, §47, at 298-99.
23. Gold, Accord and Satisfaction By a Stranger, 19 CAN. BAR REV. 165, 166-67 (1941).
The purpose of this equitable rule was to prevent unjust enrichment.
24. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§96(1)(a), 94 (1942).
25. See Battle v. Morris, 265 Ala. 581, 586, 93 So. 2d 428, 432 (1957).
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inadequate consideration. 26 When pure joint tortfeasors participated in a
mutual scheme it was natural to hold that a release of one co-defendant released all others.27 Many states extended the harsh effect of this principle
when allowing joinder of procedural joint torts. 28 Yet, the fear of double recovery against procedural joint tortfeasors is groundless, because any amount
received must be set off against the judgment. Thus, the release of one concurrent but independent tortfeasor should have the effect of releasing other
potential defendants only when the plaintiff so intends or has received full
29
compensation for his injury.
Contribution
When defendants have been held jointly and severally liable and one pays
the judgment in full, his right to move against the others for their prorata
share is termed "contribution."30 The right did not exist at common law3' and
32
some states have since denied it to both pure and procedural joint tortfeasors.
These denials, however, have been severely criticized by commentators 33 and
the majority of states now permit contribution by either statute or case law. 34
Florida nonetheless continues to deny contribution in all circumstances3 5 despite the resulting hardship.3 6
Contribution has been confused with indemnity,'3 the latter being based
upon the theory of respondeat superior. If a principal is held accountable for
the negligence of his agent and fully compensates the injured party, he may

26. A release may be given for adequate compensation. However, if the plaintiff has
been fully compensated for injuries sustained then no litigation against other defendants
will follow, satisfaction having ensued.
27. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, §49, at 301.
28. The "release-of-one, release-of-all" concept was upheld even though the settlement
agreement expressly stated that it should not have such effect, the reasoning being that such
provision was repugnant to the legal operation of the instruments. McBride v. Scott, 132
Mich. 176, 182, 93 N.V. 243, 245 (1903). See also Roper v. Florida Pub. Util. Co., 131 Fla.
709, 179 So. 904 (1938).
29.

W. PROSSER, supra note 9, §49, at 301.

30. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So.
316 (1932).
31.
32.

Id.
Id.

33. W. PRossER, supra note 9, §50, at 307.
34. Thirty states now permit contribution. It has also been approved by the UNIFORM
CONTRIBUTION AMoNG TORTFEAsORs ACr, the RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §86, and the
FEDRAL TORT CLAIMs Acr, 28 U.S.C. §1346 (1962). See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340

U.S. 543 (1951).
35.

Gordon v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 242 So. 2d 485 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Gerardi v.

Carlisle, 232 So. 2d 36 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
36. Stembler v. Smith, 242 So. 2d 472 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970). Plaintiff was struck by
defendant's automobile that was swerving to avoid a drunk pedestrian. The driver of the
automobile was denied any contribution against his co-defendants, the pedestrian, and the

liquor store.
37. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. American Dist. Eleg, Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So.
316 (1932).
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move against the agent for total reimbursement.38 When indemnity is allowed, contribution will not lie.39
SPECIFIC SETrLEMENT DEvIcEs
Through experience an attorney develops a method for evaluating a case

by which he considers all elements of potential benefit to his client. 40 To
quantify these elements, he prepares each problem as though he must try the
case before a jury41 and his preparation of demonstrative evidence may often
preclude adversary proceedings. 42 In claims against an insurer, for example,
the company adjustor frequently seeks out counsel to discover medical information the plaintiff relies upon. Usually, the adjustor will be given only a tersely
worded medical report, though it may in turn be augmented by generalized
X-ray plates, preserved skin tissue, or other evidence that gives a better perspective of the client's injuries. These supplemental materials will educate the
3
adjustor, thus allowing him to evaluate the sincerity of plaintiff's injuries.4
Additionally, if the tangible evidence is gruesome, the adjustor may foresee an
adverse jury response and thus decide to avoid trial.**
Two benefits arise from the preparation and use of evidence during compromise negotiations. The first is a type of shock effect that may be produced
in a defendant's representative by confronting him with an unexpected piece
of convincing evidence supportive of plaintiff's case.4 5 The nervous reaction
engendered is likely to weaken the representative's will to proceed to litigation, thus increasing the possibility for favorable settlement. The second
benefit is an informal means to discovery of the adverse party's evidence
through application of a principle of child psychology. Labelled by one author
as the "better than yours" principle. 6 this means involves the production of

38. This has been attacked as violative of the deep pocket theory underlying respondeat
superior and vicarious liability.
39. Melichar v. Frank, 78 S.D. 58, 61, 98 N.W.2d 345, 346 (1959).
40. Schnieder & Mone, A Positive Approach to Tort Settlement, 17 PRAc. LAW. 27 (1971),
discusses the procedure for preparing a claim and the requisite attitude for successful pretrial settlement. Settlement generally results when all parties believe they have obtained an
outcome preferable to the estimated judicial result. Note, supra note 3, at 70. The elements
to be considered by the negotiating attorney include fixed litigation costs, maximum settlement costs, probable damage award, marginal costs, and "opportunity costs." Id. at 78-79.
41. Any computation necessarily considers only the economic aspects. It is frequently
necessary, although difficult, to relate degrees of pain, sorrow, and suffering in pecuniary
terms. Furthermore, any scheme must be based upon the presumption that both parties are
rational and will bargain in the same manner, even though frequently the non-economic
motives of litigants may be so strong as to prevent any meaningful negotiation.
42. Chesley, Show and Tell Method in Settlement, TRIAL, Aug.-Sept. 1968, at 33.
43. Id.
44. Other items of demonstrative evidence may be beneficial. The use of charts, maps,
clothes, and the client himself helps to reveal the potential of each case and reflects the
attorney's preparation. Id. at 34.
45. Liberal discovery rules now largely preclude the use of such surprise tactics at trial.
FED. R. Civ. P. 34; FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.350.
46. Chesley, supra note 42, at 33, 35.
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photographs to opposing counsel with a claim that they conclusively establish
plaintiff's right to recovery. Eager to rebut this claim, opposing counsel may
then be motivated to show his own photographs on the theory that yours are
inaccurate and his are better than yours. 47
The Release
When litigants decide to settle out of court their agreement may be manifested through any one of several settlement devices. The most traditional of
these, the release, involves the surrender of the cause of action either gratuitously or for some consideration. 48 If a plaintiff releases one wrongdoer this
4
has the legal effect of releasing all others involved in the same transaction. 9
Such effect is a natural consequence of the pure joint tort, but unfortunately
it has also been extended to the procedural joint tort to which it bears no
corresponding logical relation.50
Four justifications are asserted for this rule that release of one releases all
regardless of the sufficiency of consideration. First, it is argued that judicial
construction of the instrument should be against the releasor.51 This maxim
of contract law is, however, inapplicable to tort law wherein the releasee
rather than the releasor is the most frequent author of the document.52 A
second basis for the rule is that the claimant should be limited to one recovery.53 This rationale is fallacious in that frequently the plaintiff will receive
only partial compensation to be set off from the total amount awarded.54 The
third reason is the difficulty of computing and judicially enforcing the right of
contribution. 55 Further complications arise when a settling party is held obligated to contribute to one adjudged guilty at a later trial. Nevertheless, this
reasoning is inapposite, since the rule also applies in jurisdictions denying
contribution. 5 The final reason asserted as justification is the unitary character
of the obligation. 57 However, this theory of mutuality of duty to a claimant
applies only to pure joint torts. The harsh effects of a release should therefore
58
be eliminated when there are merely procedural joint tortfeasors.
This general rule that release of one releases all is also condemned because
it places the plaintiff in the following dilemma: If he chooses to use the release

47.

Id.

48. Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Boone, 85 So. 2d 834, 843 (Fla. 1956).
49. Havighurst, The Effect of a Settlement with One Co-Obligor upon the Obligations
of the Others, 45 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1959).
50. Because the latter was designed only for convenience the failure of courts to distinguish has been sharply criticized. Id. at 3-7.
51. 2 R. DEVLIN, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY AND DErns §848 (3d ed. 1911).
52. Havighurst, supra note 49, at 34.
53. McBride v. Scott, 132 Mich. 176, 179, 93 N.W. 243, 245 (1903).
54. See FLA. STAT. §768.041(2) (1971).
55. Havighurst, supranote 49, at 5.
56. See Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Boone, 85 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1956).
57. Havighurst, supra note 49, at 6.
58. Some courts make this important distinction. Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 150
F. Supp. 79 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Hamm v. Thompson, 145 Colo. 298, 353 P.2d 73 (1960).
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he gives up his entire claim against another defendant, but if he foregoes its
use, he loses any opportunity of obtaining what he can without suit. Commentators thus argue that the rule is at best an antiquated survival of an
arbitrary common law concept, arising out of long forgotten criminal forms of
action. 59
60
Fortunately, within the last fifty years there has been statutory change
61
and only two states now adhere to the common law approach. In Florida the
release of one tortfeasor for property damage, wrongful death, or personal
injury does not discharge the liability of other joint tortfeasors, pure or procedural; a second defendant is, however, entitled to a setoff for any amount
paid by the releasor. 62 Furthermore, the existence of a release or the dismissal
63
of any defendant may not be disclosed to the jury.
A final drawback of the release is its failure to provide the pragmatic
flexibility so needed when there has been successive wrongdoing. Although
a statute may avoid harsh consequences, it is frequently an all-or-nothing affair.64 Under the Florida statute, 65 for example, an agreeing defendant may

59. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, §49, at 302.
60. Some statutes now permit a release to reserve a cause of action against others if so
expressed in the document. Others recognize an accompanying oral agreement, meeting the
parol evidence rule by holding the second tortfeasor is a party to the instrument. The requirement of express reservation of rights is unfortunate when releases are frequently signed
by those ignorant of the law and without legal advice. FLA. STAT. §768.041 (1971) avoids this
problem by treating all releases as covenants not to sue. Prior to its enactment, however,
Florida followed the common law position. See Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Boone, 85 So. 2d
834, 838 (Fla. 1956); Feiner's Organization, Inc. v. Caffina Co., 77 So. 2d 852, 853 (Fla. 1956).
In fact, the Florida supreme court once held ineffective a contractual provision that the
document was not to operate as a release of other co-defendants. Roper v. Florida Pub. Util.
Co., 131 Fla. 709, 179 So. 904 (1938). There, a sawmill corporation installed power transmission lines between mill quarters and defendant's generating plant. Plaintiff's husband, while
walking through the quarters, came in contact with a live wire and was killed. Plaintiff
entered into a "covenant-release-agreement" with the lumber company for $1,000 reserving a
right of action against the utility company. The court held the reservation clause nugatory
or repugnant to the general law of releases.
61. Washington and Virginia. See Bland v. Warwickshire Corp., 160 Va. 131, 168 S.E. 443
(1933); Haney v. Cheatham, 8 Wash. 2d 310, 111 P.2d 1003 (1941).

62.

FLA. STAT.

§768.041 (1971) states:

"(1) A release or covenant not to sue as to one tort-feasor for property damage to, personal injury of, or the wrongful death of any person shall not operate to release or discharge
the liability of any other tort-feasor who may be liable for the same tort or death.
"(2) At trial if any defendant shows the court that the plaintiff, or any person lawfully on
his behalf, has delivered a release or covenant not to sue to any person, firm or corporation
in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the
amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of
rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly.
"(3) The fact of such a release or covenant not to sue, or that any defendant has been
dismissed by order of the court shall not be made known to the jury."
63. Id.
64. See City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966), afl'd, 191 So.
2d 38 (Fla. 1966).
65, FLA. STAT. §768.041 (1971).
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not be permitted to remain at trial nor is the plaintiff fully protected. Should
a verdict for the non-agreeing defendant be returned, the plaintiff must then
be satisfied with the consideration previously received. Moreover, the statute
does not appear to cover all conceivable situations.-B
The Covenant Not To Sue
A device designed to avoid the rigors of a release is the covenant not to
sue.67 Basically, it provides that the claimant will refrain from instituting an
action against a named tortfeasor while expressly reserving all rights to proceed
against others. It is usually stipulated that the cause of action against those
named be dismissed with prejudice. 6s Essentially, the device is a subterfuge
designed to circumvent the common law rule that a release of one releases all.
The controlling distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue is
the intent of the agreeing parties.69 This intent generally is to be determined
by construction and interpretation of the document.70 For example, in an early
Florida case71 two plaintiffs, passengers in an automobile struck by defendant's
train, brought suit against the railroad. In executing documents, styled
"Covenants not To Sue," with the driver of the automobile they promised to
refrain from instituting in any manner a claim growing out of the accident.
The supreme court defined a release as an outright cancellation of the entire
obligation as to one or all of the alleged wrongdoers, in contrast to the covenant not to sue, which allows liability to continue but precludes suit against
the contracting defendant.72 Although the court held the nature of the document there in dispute to be a jury question, the court, emphasizing the comprehensive nature of the language used, found the agreement was a release. 73
The title given or exact language used in any settlement agreement thus
becomes significant only when an express provision regarding intent is absent.

66. The statute does not mention acts of slander or intentional misconduct. Its application to such tort claims has yet to be judicially determined.
67. The covenant not to sue has been termed an agreement not to proceed further.
Hicklin v. Anders, 201 Ore. 128, 253 P.2d 897 (1954). The first Florida case to recognize a
covenant not to sue was City of Miami v. Miner, 124 Fla. 684, 169 So. 609 (1936).

68. Martin v. Burney, 160 Fla. 183, 184, 34 So. 2d 36, 37 (1948).
69. E.g., Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Boone, 85 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1956); Richardson v.
Pacific Power 8: Light Co., 11 Wash. 2d 288, 118 P.2d 985 (1941).
70. E.g., Albert's Shoes v. Crabtree Constr. Co., 89 So. 2d 491, 493 (Fla. 1956); Roper v.
Florida Pub. Util. Co., 131 Fla. 709, 713, 179 So. 904, 907 (1935).
71. Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Boone, 85 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1956).

72. Id. at 843.
73. Id. at 842. An instrument was deemed to be a release as a matter of law if it dearly
so appeared on the face of the document. Id. Establishing the test to ascertain the intent
underlying an instrument, the court stated: "The pole star that guides our course in arriving
at a safe conclusion in the consideration of documents of this nature is the intent of the
parties as expressed in the document itself. Where that intent can be determined from the
language of the instrument, such intent will be conclusive in our determination.... The
construction of the document then becomes a question of law and not a jury issue." Id. (emphasis added). This test is no longer viable in Florida, since FLA. STAT. §768.041 (1971) now
treats both devices as a covenant not to sue.
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Should an attorney omit any reference to his client's intention to proceed
against non-settling defendants, he may later be precluded from asserting a
claim arising from the same transaction7 4
The Uniform Joint Obligation Act (UJOA) gives partial protection against
this hazard by providing that any discharge of a co-obligor, whether a pure or
procedural joint tortfeasor, does not operate to eliminate the liability of remaining co-obligors.75 Such reservation must, however, be in writing and directly expressed. 6 By comparison, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act takes one extra step, declaring that any settlement agreement cannot affect persons not parties thereto. 7
Florida Statute, section 768.041, treats a release equally with a covenant
not to sue.78 Regardless of the title of the document or the express reservation
clauses, neither device will preclude future action against a non-agreeing
party. 9 The amount of any consideration received must be set off from a
subsequent judgment, and the existence of any agreement may not be brought
before the jury. 80 These requirements are designed to prevent excessive verdicts
and prejudice against the non-settling defendant. 81
Determination of which injuries are compensated by the settlement is another problem that frequently arises. For example, in one Florida case,8 2- after
plaintiff's automobile had collided with defendant's, plaintiff's wife and son
were struck by a third vehicle while they were getting out of the damaged
vehicle. The owner of the third car settled for 14,000 dollars. A jury later
awarded plaintiff 62,000 dollars of which 61,000 dollars was compensation for
loss of the wife and son. The court concluded the second collision was a
natural consequence of the first and the defendant was liable for all damages
sustained. The 14,000 dollars received in settlement was nonetheless deducted
from the 62,000 dollar verdict. On appeal, plaintiff argued such money was
for injuries he sustained and not for the death of the wife and child. The
court rejected this argument holding the legislative intent was to allow one
tortfeasor to have the benefit of payment made by another who may be jointly
and severally liable.8 ' The statutory policy was interpreted as one of facilitation of settlement, and thus the setoff was proper.
The scope of section 768.041 is an additional problem. The statute encompasses "property damage to, personal injury of, or the wrongful death of

74. See Davidow v. Seyfarth, 58 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1952). In some states this danger has
been eliminated by statute. E.g., FLA. STAT. §768.041 (1971).
75. UNIFORM JOINT OBLICATIONS Acr §4. The UJOA has been adopted by five states.
76. Id. §5.
77. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT §4. This has been adopted in
original form by nine states.
78. Originally enacted as Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-395, the statute was previously numbered

Fla. Stat. §54.28 (1959).
79.
80.

FLA. STAT. §768.041(2) (1971).
FLA. STAT. §768.041(3) (1971).

81. See Jordan v. City of Coral Gables, 186 So. 2d 60, 63 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
82. Ellingson v. Willis, 170 So. 2d 311 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
83. Id. at 316.
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any person."8 4 Personal injury has been interpreted to contemplate any invasion of individual rights for which damages are allowable, including maidous prosecution.8 5 Vicarious liability has also been held within the purview of the statute 88
In a recent decision a court was faced with a fact situation in reverse of
that contemplated by section 768.041. s 7 Rather than multiple defendants and
a single plaintiff, this case initially involved several plaintiffs and only one
defendant. The claims arose when a motor scooter collided with an automobile that had been directed into an intersection by a city policeman. The
driver and a passenger on the scooter were injured. Based upon the alleged
negligence of the policeman the city settled with the driver of the motor
scooter. However, the passenger sued the city and called the driver as a witness,
questioning him as to the compromise agreement. The city's objection to the

question was sustained and affirmed on appeal, the court finding such information prejudicial and repugnant to the public policy favoring amicable settlement and the avoidance of litigation. 8 The court held that when a previous
settlement is introduced it is difficult to eradicate from the jury's mind the
conclusion that payment infers an admission of liability.8 9
The CovenantNot To Execute
The covenant not to execute illustrates the extent to which parties may
progress before achieving a satisfactory settlement. In contrast to the covenant
not to sue, which by its nature is a pretrial device, this convenant may be
agreed upon at any time after proceedings have begun. Despite this difference,
however, the weight of authority treats it as within the statutory regulations
applicable to covenants not to sue. 0
The covenant not to execute is also distinct in that it generally provides
more flexibility. The advantages generated by this characteristic are illustrated
in the Nevada case of Whittlesea v. Farmer.-'There, complainant was injured
when Whittlesea's cab, in which he was a passenger, struck an automobile operated by an employee of the Nevada Bank of Commerce. The driver of the
cab, the cab company, the bank, and the bank employee were named as defendants. Before judgment the bank and its employee paid 10,000 dollars for
plaintiff's promise not to execute against them if any judgment were ren-

84. FLA. STAT. §768.041(1) (1971).
85. Adler v. Segal, 108 So. 2d 773, 775 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
86. Hertz Corp. v. Helens, 140 So. 2d 73 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962). Whether there are other
torts not so encompassed has not been determined.
87. Jordan v. City of Coral Gables, 186 So. 2d 60 (3d D.C.A. Fla.), aff'd, 191 So. 2d 38
(Fla. 1966).
88. Id. at 63.
89. Accord, Fenberg v. Rosenthal, 348 Ili. App. 510, 518, 109 N.E.2d 402, 405 (1952).
90. E.g., Land v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 883 (N.D. Okla. 1964); Whittlesea v. Farmer,
469 P.2d 57 (Nev. 1970). Florida is in line with the majority approach. Leaseco, Inc. v. Bartlett, 257 So. 2d 629 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971), cert. denied, 262 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1972).
91. 469 P.2d 57 (Nev. 1970).
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dered.02 The agreeing defendants remained in the litigation and a verdict of
13,000 dollars was returned against all defendants. The 10,000 dollars was set
off and plaintiff sought to levy for the remainder. The Supreme Court of
Nevada held a covenant not to execute does not extinguish a cause of action
and therefore the UJOA provisions relating to pretrial settlement devices were
not controlling. 93 It maintained that the non-agreeing defendants were not
prejudiced by the presence of the agreeing defendants and the intentions of
94
the parties, not the labels on the document, were controlling.
Like the covenant not to sue, however, the covenant not to execute may
not adequately cover the area of respondeat superior.95 For example, if an
action is filed against both the principal and the agent, does any compromise
agreement with the latter automatically discharge the principal? The few
states that have faced this issue have reached conflicting conclusions,96 the
prevailing view being that any prejudgment settlement with the agent must
97
preclude further proceedings against the principal.
Since few courts have been directly confronted with the issue of prejudice
when an agreeing defendant remains and participates in the litigation, a covenant not to execute should be utilized with care. A court may find it patently
inequitable for the settling party to continue to protest his innocence before
the jury.
Mary CarterAgreements
The Mary Carter Agreement was initated in Booth v. Mary Carter Paint
Co.98 wherein plaintiff's wife had collided with three negligently parked trucks,
two owned by Mary Carter Paints. Plaintiff brought an action for loss of
consortium against the company, the drivers, and the owner of the third
truck. 99 Before judgment, the owner and driver of the third vehicle settled.
The agreement contained seven major provisions. As in a covenant not to
execute, the plaintiff agreed to levy only against the non-agreeing defendants
in return for the continued presence of the agreeing defendants in the proceedings. 10 ° Similarly, the plaintiff was guaranteed 12,500 dollars in the event
of a verdict against him.
Several unique features were also written into the compromise. For example, without regard to the verdict, the agreeing defendants' "maximum

92. Id. at 58. The state was operating under the UNIFOR'M JOINT OBLIGATIONs Acr. See
notes 75-76 and accompanying text supra.
93. 469 P.2d at 59.
94. Id.
95. Under the respondeat superiorconcept, the principal is vicariously liable for injuries
caused by his employees or agents acting within the scope of their employment. W. PROSSERa,
supra note 9, §70, at 460.
96. Compare United States v. First Sec. Bank, 208 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1953), with Land
v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 883 (N.D. Okla. 1964).
97. See Max v. Spaeth, 349 S.V.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1961).
98. 202 So. 2d 8 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
99. Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 182 So. 2d 292, 294 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
100. 202 So. 2d 8, 10 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
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liability, exposure, or financial contribution" was limited to 12,500 dollars.
Furthermore, if a verdict was returned against all defendants not in excess of
87,500 dollars, the settling defendants promised to satisfy any difference to a
maximum of 12,500 dollars. The agreement likewise expressed the parties'
intention that it did not reflect liability, extent of damages, or constitute a
release. As a final hedge, the agreement also provided that the contents were
to remain secret unless production was ordered by the court. 101
This innovative scheme is the most flexible device to date. With it an endless variety of provisions may be molded to a particular factual situation. In
Maule Industries, Inc. v. Rountree,0 2 the most recent decision, a Mary Carter
Agreement was defined as any agreement between an injured party and some
(but not all) defendants whereby limitations are placed on the financial responsibility of the agreeing defendants. The amount can vary, usually in an
inverse ratio to the amount recovered against the non-agreeing defendants03
The settlement in Maule Industries was similar to that in Mary CarterPaint.
The principal difference was plaintiff's additional agreement that if a verdict
were rendered only against the agreeing defendants, execution would not be
levied beyond the amount established during settlement.104 Conversely, if the
verdict went against all defendants, without regard to amount, plaintiff agreed
that no monetary obligation would lie against the participants in the settlement. Markedly absent was any provision that the negotiating defendant
would still pay something should the judgment be against the plaintiff.05
Because combinations and variations are limited only by counsel's ingenuity
and the willingness of the parties to sign, Florida courts are reluctant to
"paint with a brush that broad" and thus decline to invalidate Mary Carter
Agreements generically. 06 Other states, however, are presently divided as to
the validity of these devices or their equivalent.107 For example, the Supreme
Court of Nevada recently concluded the equivalent of a Mary Carter Agree-

101.

Id.

102. 264 So. 2d 445 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972), aff'd, - So. 2d 103. Id. at 446 n.1.
104. Id. at 447.

(Fla. 1973).

105. Id.
106. E.g., Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445, 447 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972);
Schwencke v. Brown, 232 So. 2d 193 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co.,
202 So. 2d 8 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967). However, not all agreements with a variety of provisions
are treated as Mary Carter agreements. See text accompanying notes 94-101. In Leaseco, Inc.
v. Bartlett, 257 So. 2d 629 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971), the injured party sued a truck driver, the
owner, and the insurer for wrongful death of his wife. Several other trucking firms were
subsequently joined. Plaintiff settled with the latter parties for $65,000 and promised to
execute only against the original defendants. All parties remained in the proceedings and the
jury was never informed of the agreement. Plaintiff received a verdict for $117,700 and the
$65,000 was setoff. On appeal, the reduction was sustained, the court declaring that while
the agreement did not correspond to the traditional release or covenant not to sue its "legal
effect . . . was such as to bring it squarely within the scope of . . . §768.041." Id. at 634.
107. Compare Lum v. Stinnett, 488 P.2d 347 (Nev. 1971), with Pellett v. Sonotone Corp.,
26 Cal. 2d 705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945).
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ment contravened public policy, was champertous, and violated legal ethics 108
Likewise, dissenting in a California decision,10 9 Justice Traynor vigorously
attacked the ethical underpinnings of the agreement, arguing the continued
presence of the agreeing defendants was a masquerade and fraud upon judicial
integrity. 110 These arguments will be considered below.
Public Policy. It is apodictic that public policy encourages the avoidance
of litigation and the prompt settlement of disputes."' However, there are
countervailing considerations that serve to circumscribe any agreement. Some
of these considerations specifically applicable to Mary Carter Agreements are
embodied in the common law actions of maintenance and champerty.
Classically defined, maintenance was anything performed with a bad mo11
It
tive, which tended to obstruct justice or promote unnecessary litigation.
one,
by
way
belongs
to
suit
that
in
no
was the officious intermeddling in a
maintaining or assisting either party.1 1 3 Champerty, a species of maintenance,
was the unlawful assistance of a suit in consideration for part of the property
in dispute or some profit out of it. 1 4 In addition, the champertor had to undertake the litigation at his own expense.11 5 Although the two were clearly
distinguished at common law, there has been a recent tendency to employ the
two concepts interchangeably." 6
It has been forcefully argued that Mary Carter Agreements are champertous
and contrary to judicial integrity. In a recent Nevada case involving this device, 117 plaintiff had initially sued three physicians for malpractice. He then
agreed with two of the doctors that if a verdict exceeded 20,000 dollars he
would execute only against the non-agreeing defendant;" 8 on the other hand,
if the verdict were less than that figure the defendants agreed to pay the difference. The Nevada court reversed a 50,000 dollar judgment arguing the

108. Lum v. Stinnett, 488 P.2d 347 (Nev. 1971).
109. Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945).
110.

Id. at 718, 160 P.2d at 789.

111. See City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60, 63 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
112. Anderson v. Trade Winds Enterprises Corp., 241 So. 2d 174, 176 (4th D.C.A. Fla.
1970).

113. R. PERKINS,

CRIMINAL

LAW 522 (2d ed. 1969). Before maintenance may be asserted as

a valid defense, the party must be injured in some manner by the intermeddling. In Pennsylvania Co. v. Vest Pa. Ry., 110 Ohio St. 516, 144 N.E. 51 (1924), a joint and several judgment was rendered against two parties and assigned to the majority stockholder of one of
the defendants. The assignee sought execution against the other defendant. The assignment
was held not to constitute maintenance, since collusion between the plaintiff and the assignee
did not affect the duties of the defendant against whom execution was sought.
114. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 522 (2d ed. 1969).
115. The common law of champerty and maintenance is in effect in Florida. FLA. STAT.
§775.01 (1971).
116. See Cone v. Benjamin, 157 Fla. 800, 27 So. 2d 90 (1946).
117. Lum v. Stinnett, 488 P.2d 347 (Nev. 1971).
118. Id. at 348. The plaintiff did not oppose motions for directed verdict for the settling
defendants.
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agreement constituted champerty, maintenance, and was prejudicial to the
remaining physician.119
The Nevada court first concluded that plaintiff should not be entitled to
call either agreeing defendant as an adverse witness and should not complain
if the third defendant cross-examined such witness, were he to take the stand
on his own. The possibility that the jury would notice only one defendant

actively defending the suit and thus deduce he was primarily responsible
further moved the court to reason that the agreement alone caused prejudicial

error.120 Maintenance was held to exist on the ground the insurance carriers'
conduct of the negotiations constituted officious intermeddling. The agreement
was also deemed champertous because the settling defendants would benefit

12
from a large verdict. '
In addition to these findings of the Nevada court, other considerations may

be advanced to invalidate this type of settlement agreement. For instance, all
jurisdictions uniformly require real parties in interest to maintain litigation.22

Because agreeing defendants are primarily interested in obtaining a large
verdict in order to relieve themselves of minimum liability, they may be
deemed sham parties, inimical to the adversary process.12 3 Likewise, the contention that a non-settling party may introduce the agreement before the jury
may be met with several objections.2 4 Coupled with the possibility of language
in the agreement regarding liability, the jury may also be influenced by the

idea that all settling parties feel such non-agreeing defendant is primarily responsible.
Florida courts today have held these arguments insufficient to override the
policy favoring settlement but, at the same time, they have carefully refrained
from condoning this new settlement device.1 25 Caution should thus be observed
in negotiating future Mary Carter Agreements, since it appears that if a
complainant and one of the co-obligors determine all rights and responsibil-

ities between them, then such obligor will lose his standing to remain in the
proceedings.

119. The court emphasized the second -defendant was the primary object of the complaint, but the third defendant received the brunt of the opening statements. Id. at 348.
120. 488 P.2d at 353.
121. Nevada has a history of insurers contending their policies are so unrelated to causes
of action as to be non-discoverable. Washoe County Bd. School Trustees v. Pirhala, 84 Nev.
1, 435 P.2d 756 (1968). The court utilized this to support its argument that the insurers have
no interest in fostering such litigation for profit. 488 P.2d at 350.
122. A real party in interest is one who, by substantive law, has the right to be enforced. Kenrich Corp. v. Miller, 256 F. Supp. 15, 17 (E.D. Pa. 1966). The requirement is
designed to prevent harassment by one who has no binding authority for prosecution or
settlement.
123. H. DRiNKER, LEAL ETHics 75 (1953), cites judicial statements that a lawyer should
not ostensibly appear for a stooge client when he really represents another.
124. Objections may be the best evidence, prejudice, and hearsay. See Jordan v. City of
Coral Gables, 186 So. 2d 60, 61 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
125. Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445, 447 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1972).
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Evidentiary and ProceduralEffects. An offer of compromise is generally
inadmissible as an admission of liability,126 yet it may be admitted as relevant
circumstantial evidence of facts other than liability.127 Some courts neverthe-

less exclude any evidence of a compromise offer without regard to its purpose.'

28

The introduction of a private document is further controlled by the principles of relevancy, materiality, and competency. 129 For documentary evidence
to be conclusive as to the facts stated it must be an instrument of record, hayfing legal efficacy, to which the person to be bound is a party or the truth of
which he vouches for and is thereby estopped to deny. 30 Thus, the contents
of a private document generally are admissible only as prima facie evidence
s
of facts asserted therein, unless such facts are stipulated or go unrebutted."
There is presently a conflict among Florida courts regarding the ability of
any party to produce the settlement document before the jury over the objection of prejudice.132 In Bill Currie Ford, Inc. v. Cash 33 the Second District
Court of Appeal of Florida was not impressed by the settling defendant's failure to cross-examine plaintiff's medical witnesses. The court concluded that
joint and several liability was the central issue, thus the non-settling defendant's opportunity to cross-examine was sufficient to protect both defendants. Although introduction of the agreement may have helped to decrease the non-agreeing defendant's liability, the prejudice to tie settling defendant was held to outweigh such consideration. 34 Conversely, in Maule
Industries, Inc. v. Rountree' 5 the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded
the agreement could be admitted, with limiting instructions, to impeach a
party witness by showing his interest in the outcome.136 If the function of required secrecy for releases and covenants not to sue is to prevent prejudice and

126.

R. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE 663 (2d ed. 1972). The privilege

is founded upon principles of relevancy and public policy.
127. For example, an offer may be introduced to prove due diligence, waiver, good faith
in asserting a claim or in performance of a contract, reliance upon an alleged promise, or
interest in the event of a suit. Watson v. Reed, 129 Ala. 388, 29 So. 837 (1901).
128. Atamnes v. St. Joseph Ry. Light, Heat & Power Co., 331 Mo. 44, 52 S.W.2d 852 (1932).
129. State v. Schaller, III Ind. App. 124, 40 N.E.2d 976 (1942).
130. Baugh v. Life & Casualty Ins., 307 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Mo. 1957); Harris v. Coleman,
170 S.E. 587, 590 (Va. 1921).
131. It may be argued that the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act permits
introduction of Mary Carter Agreements into evidence. See FLA. STAT. §92.36 (1971). That
statute requires a witness to identify the document, explain its mode of preparation, and
prove it was made in the regular course of business. However, it appears that settlement
agreements are not within the regular course of business, even for an insurance company,
which has a duty to negotiate. Note, Does the Liability Insurer Have a Duty To Compromnise?, 14 U. FLA. L. REV. 48 (1961).
132. See Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972). Cf. Bill
Currie Ford, Inc. v. Cash, 252 So. 2d 407 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
133. 252 So. 2d 407 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
134. Id. at 408.
135. 264 So. 2d 445 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
136. Id. at 448.
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reduction of damages, then it appears Mary Carter Agreements should not be
treated differently.
Whether an agreeing defendant may continue to participate in the proceedings as an adverse party has not been seriously questioned. Although there
have been attacks as to the degree of opposition, 137 Florida courts uniformly
consider the agreement ancillary in this respect. An agreeing defendant is entitled to continue to assert his freedom from liability, albeit he had previously
compensated plaintiff to a degree. As to the issue of whether he may be called
as an adverse party witness, it has been held that he may be cross-examined by
leading questions by both the plaintiff and the non-settling defendant. 138
A final recurring problem with Mary Carter Agreements is the right to pretrial discovery. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure'3 9 opposing counsel
is entitled to require production or inspection of any document that does not
constitute work product. 4 ° Following this guideline, few courts refuse discovery of any settlement agreement.' 4' The primary justification is the possibility of the agreement being within the setoff requirements of Florida Statute,
section 768.041 . 4 - Because the setoff amount may be an important issue, Mary
Carter Agreements again should be treated in this traditional manner.
CONCLUSION

Offering a variety of adaptations, Mary Carter Agreements are the most
recent innovation in settlement devices with joint tortfeasors. Although Florida
has found they do not contravene public policy per se, they should be used
with caution, as some courts may be reluctant to sustain particular provisions.
Apparently, any agreement to keep the settlement secret would have to yield
to discovery demands. Furthermore, a court may frown upon the agreeing
defendant's continued presence in the litigation. Similarly, there is disagreement as to whether the agreement is prejudicial and should not be disclosed
to the jury, with the purpose for which it is offered emerging as the determinative factor. Each situation thus demands a balancing of the need for such information against its potentially harmful effects.
In the positive vein, the new device helps to avoid costly litigation and
permits a party who has been injured by independent wrongdoers to obtain
the best of two worlds - he is guaranteed at least partial recovery without
sacrificing a cause of action against the non-agreeing defendant. Moreover,

137.
138.
1.450.
139.
140.
141.
v. Mary
produce
142.

See Lum v. Stinnett, 448 P.2d 347 (Nev. 1971).
Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972); FLA. R. CIV. P.
FE. R. Civ. P. 34.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
E.g., Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972); Booth
Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967). The consequence of failure to
is governed by FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380.
Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445, 449 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
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any defendant who is willing to negotiate has an opportunity to escape with
minimal financial loss.
With the growth of vicarious liability and the increase of suits against
:
several tortfeasors, settlement devices will play an ascending role.143
Mary
Carter Agreements provide a refreshing alternative to statutorily restricted releases and covenants not to sue. They deserve further analysis as to their effect
upon the parties involved and their efficiency at producing observed out of
court settlement.
R.

MICHAEL KENNEDY

143. For a detailed discussion of innovative schemes presently being utilized by insurance
companies, see Note, New Developments in the Settlement of Automobile Liability Claims,
48 J. URBAN L. 449 (1971).
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